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Abstract—Deep learning has made significant breakthroughs in
many fields, including electroencephalogram (EEG) based brain-
computer interfaces (BCIs). However, deep learning models are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks, in which deliberately designed
small perturbations are added to the benign input samples to
fool the deep learning model and degrade its performance.
This paper considers transferability-based black-box attacks,
where the attacker trains a substitute model to approximate the
target model, and then generates adversarial examples from the
substitute model to attack the target model. Learning a good
substitute model is critical to the success of these attacks, but
it requires a large number of queries to the target model. We
propose a novel framework which uses query synthesis based
active learning to improve the query efficiency in training the
substitute model. Experiments on three convolutional neural
network (CNN) classifiers and three EEG datasets demonstrated
that our method can improve the attack success rate with the
same number of queries, or, in other words, our method requires
fewer queries to achieve a desired attack performance. To our
knowledge, this is the first work that integrates active learning
and adversarial attacks for EEG-based BCIs.
Keywords—Brain-computer interfaces; adversarial examples;
active learning; black-box attack
I. INTRODUCTION
A brain-computer interface (BCI) is a communication sys-
tem that connects a human brain and a computer [1]. Direct
dialogue between the brain and the computer can be achieved
by the established information path. Electroencephalogram
(EEG) is the most frequently used input signal in BCIs, due to
its low cost and convenience [2]. Various paradigms are used
in EEG-based BCIs, such as P300 evoked potentials [3]–[6],
motor imagery (MI) [7], steady-state visual evoked potential
(SSVEP) [8], etc.
Deep learning has achieved great success in numerous
fields. Multiple convolutional neural network (CNN) classifiers
have also been proposed for EEG-based BCIs. Lawhern et
al. [9] proposed EEGNet, which can be applied to different
BCI paradigms. Schirrmeister et al. [10] designed a deep CNN
model (DeepCNN) and a shallow CNN model (ShallowCNN).
In addition, there were some studies to convert EEG signals
into images and then classify them with deep learning mod-
els [11]–[13]. This paper considers only CNN models (i.e.,
EEGNet, DeepCNN, ShallowCNN) which take the raw EEG
signals as the input.
Despite their state-of-the-art performance, recent studies
have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to
adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding small
imperceptible perturbations to benign examples to degrade the
performance of a well-trained deep learning model. For ex-
ample, in face recognition, an adversarial perturbation can be
attached to the glasses, and the attacker who wears it can avoid
being recognized, or be recognized as another person [14].
In image classification, the adversarial examples can fool a
deep learning model to give incorrect image labels [15]–[18].
Many adversarial attacks have also been performed in speech
recognition [19], malware classification [20], semantic seg-
mentation [21], etc. Recently, Zhang and Wu [22] verified that
adversarial examples exist in EEG-based BCIs and proposed
several adversarial attack approaches.
Many effective algorithms for generating adversarial exam-
ples have been proposed, such as the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [15], the C&W method [23], L-BFGS [16], the basic
iterative method [17], DeepFool [24], etc. These methods
mainly considered the white-box attack scenario, where the
attacker has full access to the target model, including its archi-
tecture and parameters. Accordingly, the attacker can perform
attacks by adding perturbations along the direction calculated
by gradient-based strategies or optimization-based strategies.
However, the white-box setting requires full information of
the target model, making it impractical in many real-world
applications.
In this paper, we focus on a more realistic and challenging
black-box attack scenario, where the attacker can only observe
the target model’s responses to inputs but has no infor-
mation about its architecture, parameters, and training data.
The attacker needs to generateadversarial examples whose
perturbations are constrained to a magnitude threshold with
limited queries. Papernot et al. [25] proposed a black-box
attack method which generated adversarial examples for a
white-box substitute model and attacked the black-box target
model based on the transferability. Zhang and Wu [22] pro-
posed an unsupervised fast gradient sign method (UFGSM)
to craft adversarial examples for black-box attacks in EEG-
based BCIs. However, these transferability-based approaches
suffered from low query efficiency: they usually require a
large number of queries to build a substitute model that is
sufficiently similar to the target model.
To address this issue, we introduce a query synthesis
based active learning strategy to transferability-based black-
box attacks of EEG-based BCIs. Given a small amount of
initial training EEG epochs for the substitute model, we first
randomly obtain a pair of opposite instances in each iteration,
i.e., two instances of different classes. According to the initial
opposite-pair, we use a binary search strategy to synthesize
another opposite-pair close to the current classification bound-
ary in the input space. After that, we synthesize queries along
the perpendicular line of the previously found opposite-pair.
This query synthesis based active learning strategy can directly
synthesize queries which are close to the target model’s
decision boundary and well scattered. It improves the query
efficiency by directly searching for informative examples in
the input space for substitute model training, instead of taking
a fixed step along the gradient direction. Experiments on
three CNN classifiers and three BCI datasets demonstrated the
effectiveness of our proposed method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces related work on black-box adversarial attacks
and active learning. Section III proposes our query synthesis
based active learning approach for crafting adversarial exam-
ples for black-box attacks in EEG-based BCIs. Section IV
evaluates the attack performance of our proposed approach.
Finally, Section V draws conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review previous studies on black-
box attacks and active learning.
A. Black-Box Attacks
Black-box attacks can be roughly divided into three cate-
gories: decision-based, score-based and transferability-based.
Decision-based attacks were first proposed by Brendel et
al. [26]. Its main idea is to gradually reduce the magnitude of
the adversarial perturbation while ensuring its effectiveness.
Score-based attacks rely on the model’s output scores, e.g.,
class probabilities or logits, to estimate the gradients and then
generate adversarial examples [27], [28]. Transferability-based
attacks were first proposed by Papernot et al. [25] in image
classification. The attacker trains a substitute model, which
solves the same classification problem as the target model, to
generate adversarial examples for the target model.
In transferability-based black-box attacks, the key step is to
learn a substitute model whose decision boundary resembles
the target model’s. Papernot et al. [25] used Jacobian-based
dataset augmentation to synthesize a substitute training set
and labeled it by querying the target model. By alternatively
augmenting the training set and updating the substitute model,
it can gradually approximate the target model. Recently, Zhang
and Wu [22] extended this idea to EEG-based BCIs, but
their approach was slightly different: they synthesized a new
training set by using the loss computed from the inputs, instead
of the labels from the target model, to calculate the Jacobian
matrix.
Albeit the outstanding attack performance of these methods,
they always require a large number of queries to train a
substitute model. Generally, the number of queries grows ex-
ponentially with the number of iterations. In order to improve
the query efficiency, we propose an active learning based
data augmentation approach to train the substitute model in
transferability-based black-box attacks.
B. Active Learning
Active learning is an effective way to reduce the data
labeling effort, by actively selecting the most useful instances
to label. There are two main scenarios of active learning in the
literature: query synthesis [29]–[32] and sampling. The latter
can be further divided into stream-based sampling [33], [34]
and pool-based sampling [35]–[38]. Sampling-based active
learning selects real unlabeled instances from a pool or steam
for labeling. In query synthesis based active learning, one
can query any data instance in the input space, including
synthesized instances.
Intuitively, query synthesis can be applied to the training
process of the substitute model to improve the query efficiency
of black-box attacks, because it can actively synthesize more
informative EEG epochs than generating some epochs in
Jacobian-based way. Furthermore, compared with sampling,
it is more efficient to synthesize a query directly instead of
evaluating every instance in an unlabeled data pool. Here we
don’t need to worry about the fact that some synthesized EEG
epochs may be unrecognizable to human [39], because the
target model can label any instance in the input space. Our
ultimate goal is to identify the decision boundary of the target
model by a minimum number of queries.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first introduce the transferability-based
black-box attack setting for CNN classifiers in EEG-based
BCIs, and then describe the query-synthesis-based active
learning strategy for training the substitute model, and adver-
sarial example crafting for the target model.
A. Attack Setting
The attack framework in this paper is the same as our
previous work [22], where the attackers can add adversarial
perturbations before the machine learning modules.
Let xi ∈ RC×T be the i-th raw EEG epoch (i = 1, ..., n),
where C is the number of EEG channels and T the number of
the time domain samples. Let fθ(xi) → yi denote the CNN
model that predicts the label for an input EEG epoch.
Given a target CNN model and a normal EEG epoch xi, the
task is to generate an adversarial example x∗
i
misclassified by
the CNN model. Formally, an adversarial example x∗i should
satisfy the following constraints:
fθ(x
∗
i ) 6= yi, (1)
D(xi,x
∗
i ) 6 ǫ, (2)
where D(·, ·) is a distance metric, and ǫ constrains the magni-
tude of the adversarial perturbation. (1) ensures the success of
the attack, and (2) ensures that the perturbation is not larger
than a predefined upper bound ǫ.
Next we describe an algorithm to learn a substitute model
for a given target CNN classifier by querying it for labels
on query-synthesized inputs, and then introduce the UFGSM
approach [22] to craft adversarial examples on the trained
substitute model, which can also be transferred to the target
model. We start with binary classification, and then extend it
to multi-class tasks.
B. Query-synthesis-based Dataset Augmentation for Training
the Substitute Model
In the black-box attack scenario, we have no access to the
architecture, parameters and training data of the target model,
but can input EEG trials to the target model and observe
the corresponding outputs to probe the model. As in [25],
we also adopt the transferability-based approach to implement
the black-box attack. The difference is that we use a query-
synthesis-based active learning strategy as the data augmen-
tation technique in substitute model training rather than the
Jacobian-based approach. The oracle in query synthesis active
learning is the target model.
1) Binary search synthesis: Assume a small labeled train-
ing set S0 has been obtained from querying the target model.
An initial substitute model f ′0 can be trained on this set. Sup-
pose {x+0 ,x
−
0 } is an opposite-pair in S0. Then, we query their
middle point on the substitute model to find another opposite-
pair closer to the decision boundary, using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Binary search synthesis. {x+,x−} =
BinarySearch({x+0 ,x
−
0 }, f
′,m)
Input: {x+0 ,x
−
0 }, initial opposite-pair of EEG epochs;
f ′, current substitute model; m, maximum
number of binary search iterations.
Output: {x+,x−}, an opposite-pair of EEG epochs.
x
+ = x+0 ;
x
− = x−0 ;
for i = 1 to m do
xb = (x
+ + x−)/2;
Query f ′ for yb, the label of xb;
if yb is positive then
x
+ ← xb
else
x
− ← xb
end
end
return {x+,x−}
2) Mid-perpendicular synthesis: There is an obvious lim-
itation in binary search synthesis: if we always use binary
search to generate training epochs, they may concentrate in
one area and lack diversity. Therefore, we synthesize the next
query along the mid-perpendicular direction after we find an
opposite-pair close enough to the decision boundary. Specifi-
cally, we find the opposite-pair’s orthogonal vector by Gram-
Schmidt process [32], set the magnitude of the orthogonal
vector to q, then move it to a more precise midpoint. The
details are shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Mid-perpendicular synthesis. xs =
MidPerp({x+
b
,x−
b
}, f ′, k, q)
Input: {x+
b
,x−
b
}, an opposite-pair of EEG epochs; f ′,
current substitute model; m, maximum number of
binary search iterations; q, magnitude of the
orthogonal vector.
Output: xs, an synthesized EEG epoch.
x1 = x
+
b
− x−
b
;
Generate an EEG epoch x2 randomly;
Find the orthogonal direction by Gram-Schmidt process:
x2 = q · (x2 − 〈x1,x2〉/〈x1,x2〉 × x1);
{x+,x−} = BinarySearch({x+
b
,x−
b
}, f ′,m);
xs = x2 + (x
+ + x−)/2.
return xs
With this query-syntheses-based active learning strategy, the
entire substitute model training process for binary classifica-
tion is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Query-synthesis-based substitute model
training strategy.
Input: f , the target model; S0, a set of unlabeled EEG
epochs; Nmax, maximum number of training
epochs; nmax, maximum number of synthesized
EEG epochs in one iteration; m, maximum
number of binary search iterations; q, magnitude
of the orthogonal vector.
Output: f ′, a trained substitute model
Label S0 by querying f to obtain an initial training set
D;
Initialize f ′ and pre-train f ′ on D;
∆D = ∅;
for N = 1 to Nmax do
∆S = ∅;
for n = 1 to nmax do
Select an opposite pair x+0 and x
−
0 randomly
from D;
{x+
b
,x−
b
} = BinarySearch({x+0 ,x
−
0 }, f
′,m);
xs =MidPerp({x
+
b
,x−
b
}, f ′,m, q);
∆S ← ∆S
⋃
{xs};
end
∆D = {(xi, f(xi))}xi∈∆S ;
D ← D
⋃
∆D;
Train f ′ on D;
end
return f ′
We then extend query-synthesis-based augmentation method
to multi-class classification, by the simple one-vs-one ap-
proach, which decomposes a multi-class task into multiple
binary classification tasks. More specifically, if there are
k1 classes, then we can solve k2 = k1(k1 − 1)/2 binary
classifications instead, and use our active learning strategy to
synthesize nmax/k2 EEG epochs (where nmax is the maximum
number of synthesized EEG epochs in one iteration) for each
binary task.
C. Adversarial Example Crafting for the Target Model
After training the substitute model, we can generate adver-
sarial examples from it for the target model. Goodfellow et
al. [15] proposed to construct adversarial perturbations in the
following way:
δ = ε · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, yi)), (3)
where θ are the parameters of the target model f , and J
the loss function. The main idea is to find an optimal max-
norm perturbation δ constrained by ε to maximize J . The
requirements in (2) holds if ε ≤ ǫ and l∞-norm is used as the
distance metric.
Let ε = ǫ so that we can perturb xi at the maximum extent.
Then, the adversarial example x∗
i
can be re-expressed as:
x
∗
i = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, yi)). (4)
UFGSM [22] is an unsupervised extension of FGSM, which
replaces the label yi in (4) by y
′
i = f(xi). Then, x
∗
i in UFGSM
can be written as:
x
∗
i = xi + ǫ · sign(∇xiJ(θ,xi, y
′
i)). (5)
UFGSM was used in this paper to construct the adversarial
examples.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents the experimental results to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the query-synthesis-based active
learning strategy in transferability-based black-box attacks. We
evaluate the vulnerability of three CNN classifiers in EEG-
based BCIs.
A. Experimental Setup
The three BCI datasets, P300 evoked potentials (P300)
[40], feedback error-related negativity (ERN)1 [41], and motor
imagery (MI)2 [42], used in our recent study [22] were used
again in this study. The data pre-processing steps were also
identical. Three CNN classifiers, EEGNet [9], DeepCNN [10],
and ShallowCNN [10] were used as the target models in
our experiments, as in [22]. Adam optimizer [43], cross-
entropy loss function, and early stopping were used in training.
Moreover, we applied weights to different classes to address
the class imbalance problem in P300 and ERN.
Raw classification accuracy (RCA) and balanced classifica-
tion accuracy (BCA) were used to evaluate the attack perfor-
mance, where RCA is the unweighted overall classification
accuracy on the test set, and BCA is the average of the
individual RCAs of different classes.
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/inria-bci-challenge
2http://www.bbci.de/competition/iv/
In order to simulate the black-box scenario, we partitioned
the three datasets into two groups, as described in [22]:
the larger group A of 7/14/7 subjects in P300/ERN/MI was
used to simulate the unknown data from the target model,
where 80% epochs were for training the target model and the
remaining 20% for testing. The other smaller group B of 1/2/2
subjects was used to initialize set S0 for training the substitute
model. In this way, the 8/16/9 subjects in three datasets
can be partitioned in 8/120/36 different ways. We performed
both one-division and multi-division black-box attacks. In the
one-division experiment, the attacks were repeated 5 times
to reduce randomness. In the multi-division experiment, we
repeated each division 5 times on P300 and only one time on
ERN and MI; so, in total we had 40/120/36 evaluations on the
three datasets, respectively.
B. Baseline
We first evaluated the baseline performance of the three
CNN target models on the unperturbed EEG data, as shown
in the first part of Table I. Because the MI dataset had 4 classes
whereas P300 and ERN had only two, its RCAs and BCAs
were much lower.
We then constructed a random perturbation δ′:
δ′ = ǫ · sign (N (0, 1)) , (6)
which has the same maximum amplitude ǫ as the adversarial
perturbations, to verify the necessity of deliberately construct-
ing the adversarial examples. The results are shown in the
second part of Table I. It is obvious that the target models were
robust to random noise, i.e., random noise cannot effectively
perform adversarial attacks.
C. Attack Performance Comparison
We next compared our query-synthesis-based approach with
the Jacobian-based method [22] in black-box attacks. ǫ =
0.1/0.1/0.05 on P300/ERN/MI were used to construct the
adversarial examples after the substitute models were trained.
In one-division experiments, we randomly downsampled the
data for each class according to the labels that the target
model predicted at the first time to balance the classes in
the initial dataset. We set the downsampled number in each
class as 200 in P300 and ERN, and 100 in MI, to ensure
that the size of the initial substitute model training set S0
was 400. The initial substitute model was then trained on
S0 using both the Jacobian-based method and ours. λ = 0.5
and N = 1 were used in the Jacobian-based method, where
N corresponds to Nmax in our method. nmax = 200 and
m = 10 were used in our method, so Nmax = 2 should be used
to get the same number of queries as in the Jacobian-based
method. q = 1.0/0.8/0.8 on P300/ERN/MI were used in the
experiments. They were determined such that the generated
EEG epochs had approximately the same magnitudes as those
in the initial training set S0.
In multi-division experiments, we did not limit
downsampled number to avoid wasting data, but always
kept the same number of queries in the Jacobian-based
TABLE I
AVERAGE RCAS/BCAS (%) OF DIFFERENT TARGET CLASSIFIERS ON THE THREE DATASETS BEFORE AND AFTER BLACK-BOX ATTACKS.
Experiment Dataset Target Model f
Baselines
Method
Substitute Model f ′
Original Noisy EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
One-Division
P300
EEGNet 73.81/72.71 73.78/72.46
Ours 54.90/54.63 41.39/50.80 72.71/71.79
Jacobian-based 62.36/61.64 54.58/55.55 72.07/72.02
DeepCNN 77.77/74.79 78.08/74.78
Ours 69.77/70.52 47.41/59.00 74.86/73.38
Jacobian-based 66.40/66.82 53.11/60.13 76.99/74.20
ShallowCNN 72.56/72.87 72.64/72.87
Ours 63.43/65.17 60.84/62.18 66.54/67.91
Jacobian-based 67.52/67.74 74.20/66.15 73.24/71.73
ERN
EEGNet 76.26/74.19 75.47/73.34
Ours 36.55/38.23 36.55/41.10 73.56/71.76
Jacobian-based 52.07/51.65 47.06/50.94 75.82/72.37
DeepCNN 77.21/76.85 75.05/76.38
Ours 46.22/46.57 52.07/61.59 75.14/73.99
Jacobian-based 51.65/52.79 55.36/64.33 75.67/75.97
ShallowCNN 71.85/71.17 71.51/70.95
Ours 70.69/71.44 69.75/70.66 44.82/49.81
Jacobian-based 72.16/71.50 70.73/71.22 52.10/53.57
MI
EEGNet 54.93/54.62 52.93/52.78
Ours 31.77/31.70 35.96/36.07 40.27/40.28
Jacobian-based 37.07/36.87 35.26/35.24 41.01/41.02
DeepCNN 49.38/49.18 49.73/49.56
Ours 41.91/41.78 39.24/39.08 38.14/38.05
Jacobian-based 45.36/45.22 40.56/40.48 41.09/41.06
ShallowCNN 60.96/60.81 61.04/60.93
Ours 51.93/52.06 51.93/52.01 43.60/43.68
Jacobian-based 55.05/55.18 48.28/48.44 48.97/49.00
Multi-Division
P300
EEGNet 73.59/71.95 73.52/71.83
Ours 41.40/42.44 32.66/39.75 64.95/64.91
Jacobian-based 47.02/48.49 39.79/41.99 65.16/64.16
DeepCNN 75.99/74.10 76.20/73.94
Ours 53.29/55.10 36.57/44.55 68.78/66.88
Jacobian-based 59.18/60.01 44.54/49.66 70.05/66.98
ShallowCNN 72.23/71.90 72.24/71.85
Ours 59.66/60.17 51.76/55.15 53.80/49.60
Jacobian-based 59.75/61.73 51.40/57.91 52.38/52.54
ERN
EEGNet 73.89/72.94 73.23/72.72
Ours 45.71/47.29 46.78/48.94 71.27/71.14
Jacobian-based 54.42/54.47 52.54/54.53 71.22/70.97
DeepCNN 74.24/72.69 73.86/72.38
Ours 56.78/55.07 53.85/53.33 72.44/70.89
Jacobian-based 59.64/58.32 57.77/57.54 72.73/71.43
ShallowCNN 71.86/71.45 71.77/71.21
Ours 70.15/70.46 68.49/69.28 58.28/59.42
Jacobian-based 70.44/70.30 70.31/70.18 63.51/63.80
MI
EEGNet 60.85/60.71 59.48/59.39
Ours 35.10/35.27 46.47/46.45 43.60/43.67
Jacobian-based 39.13/39.13 46.58/46.61 53.19/53.17
DeepCNN 55.83/55.57 55.65/55.39
Ours 47.06/46.90 45.32/45.31 42.54/42.46
Jacobian-based 48.68/48.59 48.45/48.38 48.72/48.57
ShallowCNN 64.71/64.62 64.18/64.09
Ours 57.26/57.32 57.94/57.98 46.74/46.84
Jacobian-based 59.44/59.49 59.04/59.07 54.56/54.56
method and ours. so nmax = downsampling number on
P300 and ERN, nmax = 2 ∗ downsampling number on MI
in our method, the other hyper-parameters were the same
as those in one-division experiments. The attack results are
shown in Table I. We can observe that:
1) Generally, the RCAs and BCAs of the target models af-
ter attacks were lower than the corresponding baselines,
indicating the effectiveness of the transferability-based
black-box attack methods. However, shallowCNN did
not perform well in attacking EEGNet and deepCNN
on P300 and ERN.
2) The RCAs and BCAs after query-synthesis-based black-
box attacks were generally lower than the corresponding
accuracy after Jacobian-based black-box attacks. For
example, in one-division experiments in which only
400 queries were used for both methods, when the
target model and the substitute model were EEGNet and
DeepCNN respectively on P300, our method achieved
13% improvement over the Jacobian-based method.
3) Our proposed method was often much better than the
Jacobian-based method when the substitute model and
the target model had the same structure, which may
due to the strong intra-transferability of the adversarial
examples.
We compared the attack performance with different number
of queries when the substitute model and the target model had
the same architecture, i.e., both were EEGNet, DeepCNN or
ShllowCNN. 200 EEG epochs were used for initializing the
substitute model, and the number of queries varied from 200
to 6,200. The corresponding RCAs/BCAs are shown in Fig. 1.
Generally, both RCAs and BCAs decreased as the number of
queries increased, which is intuitive. With the same number of
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Fig. 1. RCAs and BCAs of the two black-box attack methods with different number of queries on P300 (top row), ERN (middle row) and MI (bottom row).
queries, our method achieved lower RCAs and BCAs than the
Jacobian-based method, i.e., it gave higher attack success rates.
In other words, it can achieve a desired attack success rate
with much fewer queries. For example, for EEGNet on P300,
our method only needed 3,000 queries to achieve a comparable
attack performance with the Jacobian-based method with 6,200
queries.
D. Characteristics of the Adversarial Examples
In this section, we analyzed the characteristics of the gen-
erated adversarial examples in both time domain and spectral
domain.
Consider one-division query-synthesis-based black-box at-
tacks on ERN after 400 queries, when both the target model
and the substitute model are DeepCNN. An example of the
original EEG epoch (we only show the first 10 channels) and
its corresponding adversarial epoch is shown in Fig. 2. They
were almost completely overlapping in the time domain, which
means the adversarial example is very difficult to be detected
by human or a computer. We had similar observations on other
datasets and from other classifiers.
Next, spectrogram analysis was used to further explore
the characteristics of the adversarial examples. Fig. 3 shows
the mean spectrogram of all original EEG epochs, of all
adversarial examples whose predicted labels did not match
the ground-truth labels of the original EEG epochs (successful
attacks), and of the corresponding successful perturbations
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Fig. 2. Example of an original EEG epoch and its adversarial epoch, generated
by query-synthesis-based black-box attack on the ERN dataset. The first 10
channels are shown. ǫ = 0.1.
(x∗ − x), by using wavelet decomposition. The adversarial
examples were crafted by query-synthesis-based black-box
attacks on MI. Both the target and the substitute models
were DeepCNN. There was no significant difference in the
spectrograms of the original EEG epochs and the adversarial
examples. The amplitudes of the mean spectrogram of the
Fig. 3. Mean spectrogram of the original EEG epochs, of all successful adversarial examples, and of the corresponding perturbations, in one-division
query-synthesis-based black-box attacks on the MI dataset. Channel Fz was used.
adversarial perturbations were much smaller than those of
the original and adversarial examples, suggesting that our
generated adversarial examples are difficult to be detected by
spectrogram analysis. We had similar observations on other
datasets and from other classifiers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a query-synthesis-based
active learning strategy for transferability-based black-box
attacks. It improves the query efficiency by actively synthe-
sizing EEG epochs scattering around the decision boundary
of the target model, and thus the trained substitute model can
better approximate the target model. We applied our method
to attacking three state-of-the-art deep learning classifiers in
EEG-based BCIs. Experiments demonstrated its effectiveness
and efficiency. With the same number of queries, it can achieve
better attack performance than the traditional Jacobian-based
method; or, in other words, our approaches needs a smaller
number of queries to achieve a desired attack success rate.
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